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ABSTRACT: 
 
An irony observed in microfinance these days is its great preference for savings products 
rather than credit products for households. For some authors, this phenomenon is 
explained by the fact that microfinance’s products especially its loan products don’t meet 
the households demand. This paper analyses the Ivorian credit market so as to understand 
the determinants of credit choices from Banks, formal MFIs, and informal sources. The 
lack of trust in the microfinance institutions, and the size of loan among other factors play 
an important role. The presence of a higher level of social network justifies the low 
demand for credit witness by microfinance institutions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Financial market imperfections, such as information asymmetries and transactions costs, 
are likely to constrain access to credit the talented poor, the micro and small enterprises -
that lack collateral, credit histories, and connections- thus limiting them to take up 
opportunities and leading to the persistence of inequality and slower growth. This is 
translated by the Conventional wisdom that lending to poor household will fail because 
the costs of doing so are too high; risks are too great, saving propensities of these 
households are too low, and just a few households have much to put up as collateral.  
To solve this critical problem, government and donors implemented credit policies 
oriented towards specifics economic activities. Between the 1950s and 1970s 
governments and donors focused on providing subsidized agricultural credit to small and 
marginal farmers, in view of raising productivity and incomes. But the policies failed. 
According to Deshmukh-Ranadive and Murthy (2005), the repayment schedules were 
based on the expected income flow from investment. However, returns were often over 
estimated, especially in the context of agricultural production. They depended heavily on 
unpredictable weather conditions. So, the low rate of repayment was observed. In 
addition, there was also dependence on the fluctuating priorities of governments and 
donor agencies. Hence, credit provision for poor people was intermittent and limited. 
Furthermore, over time, there has been a global trend in criticism of subsidized forms 
credit. Attention has been focused on market based solution as against state based 
solutions. 
Exclusion from financial system, render the poor as well as small enterprises to rely on 
their personal wealth or internal resources to invest for education, become entrepreneurs, 
or to take engage in promising growth opportunities. The Microfinance’s framework 
should be an ideal to provide to vulnerable group of population similar products and 
services as formal sector financial institutions do too. Though the scale and method of 
delivery differ, the savings, loans, and insurance services provided by both institutions are 
similar. Concerning loans, the dominant product offered by the MFIs remains an 
enterprise or business lending (Woller,2002a). Despite some successes witnessed, all 
promises of microfinance are yet to be fulfilled in reality. 
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It is however ironical from credit union experience that poor people have a much higher 
demand for savings products than lending services (Richardson, 2000).The higher savings 
amount demonstrate this great preference. Since savings have a positive impact on 
sustainability of microfinance institutions (the fact that savings constitute the main 
resource is accepted by all), the poor’s attitude toward greater savings could be profitable 
for the MFIs. Nonetheless, the main goal of microfinance is to alleviate poverty. MFIs are 
supposed to improve the welfare of the poor and exclude people of the formal banks. One 
way of helping the poor is providing loans to them. But, this social objective is hardly 
attained.  
In addition, there are potential clients who refuse to join programs even though the 
products offered were supposedly designed for them. The fact that many in the target 
population refuse to participate suggests to some that something may be amiss (Meyer, 
2002). This threatens social objective attainment. 
Most of the advocates in favor of self sustainability say that attaining self sustainability  
could impact outreach in terms of the growth of number of people participating. They 
neglect the socio-cultural environment in which potential participants find themselves. 
The existence of social network capital and other socio-cultural factors may influence 
their behavior. Consequently, there is need to know what explain the participation in a 
credit program in Côte d’Ivoire - demand side- such as to enable an understanding of how 
to increase low-income households’ access to credit. In other words, what poor people’s 
borrowing from MFIs or others sources? What explain the phenomena observed with 
households in credit union? Is the credit too expensive? Or is it because of lack of 
information about their services? Or, are MFIs too far from the areas that poor people 
live? In short, what are the factors influencing households participation in microfinance 
credit program?  
In this paper, we investigate on the determinants of credit program participation. The main 
goal of this study is to know the factors influencing the households’ decision to borrow 
from MFIs. Second we try to explain what justify the lower preference for credit or the 
lower demand for credit from credit union. For conducting our study, we take as evidence  
Côte d’Ivoire. 
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Motivation for the study 
The motivations of this study are at several levels. Firstly, at the academic level where, in 
contrast to the large volume of theoretical research on credit markets, the empirical 
literature is surprisingly scarce. This situation is partly due to the lack of reliable micro-
level data on borrowing and lending in developing countries. Only few researchers 
attempt to analyze what determine the household access to credit, particularly rural 
households. All emphasize on the fact the motivations exist and they could explain the 
households’ participation in credit program provided by the microfinance. 
 
Second, since the objective of microfinance is to allow the poor and low income people to 
access credit, higher rate of participation ought to be observed. But, a contrast exist 
between the expectation and the realization of the objective; leading to lower rate of credit 
participation. Most studies analyze this as credit rationing and they study the household’s 
behavior under this situation. Some authors give as explanation that the credit products 
don’t meet the demand for credit by households (Meyer, 2002)1. In our point of view, they 
don’t take into account the presence of social networks and the cultural environment of 
potential borrowers. 
 
Finally, this study could be helping the policy makers in the reformulation of credit 
policies. Microfinance managers will know key variables influencing the demand for loan 
and those explaining observed preference. 
 
2. Microfinance industry in Côte d’Ivoire 
Country profile 
Located on the Gulf of Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire (which means "Ivory Coast") is a West 
African country bordering the North Atlantic Ocean between Ghana and Liberia. It made 
up of the savannah zones in the (north), the forest zones in the west and south. She has a 
population of about 18.6 millions, which has been growing at about 3.5% per year. 51% 
of the population is men and 49% are women. 55% of the population lives in rural areas 
and 45% in urban areas (Human Development Report 2007/2008). The population 
                                                            
1 He called this “the demand for flexible microfinance products”. 
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includes 5 major ethnic groups: the Kru, Akan, Volta, Mande( South and North), and 
Malinke, inhabiting both the savannas and rain forests.  
Côte d’Ivoire is ranked 164th out of 177 countries in the Human Development Index. The 
poverty rate in 2006 was estimated at 43.2 per cent in the report on poverty published in 
2007, based on a poverty line of XOF 162 800 per capita in annual expenditure. Poverty is 
most severe in the rural savannah (54.6 percent) and the eastern rural forest (46.6 per 
cent), followed by urban areas apart from Abidjan (33.8 per cent), the western rural forest 
(24.5 per cent) and Abidjan (11.1 per cent). It is particularly harsh in the northern 
savannah and in the rural forest. 
Macroeconomic and Policy Environment 
Côte d’Ivoire has experienced widely varying phases of economic growth over the last 
few decades. After being considered as middle-income country during the 1970s, it was 
subsequently reclassified as a highly indebted and poor country (HIPC). The economy 
rests essentially on agricultural resources. Agriculture employs 66 per cent of Côte 
d’Ivoire’s workforce and contributes 70 per cent of export revenue. Cash crops, mainly 
cocoa and coffee, account for nearly 50 per cent of agricultural value added. Gross 
domestic product (GDP) stood at US$ 16.8 Billion in 2005. Côte d’Ivoire’s per capita 
GNP of US$900 in 2005 is much lower than the average per capita income level of 
US$1,998 for Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2007). 
Côte d’Ivoire has focused on poverty reduction as the core of its development strategy. 
She has a program of poverty reduction since June 1997. The government of republic II 
has decided to make the poverty reduction the priority axis to its economic and social 
program. 
Ivoirian’s financial sector as well as the developing countries financial sector is 
characterized by the limited outreach of the commercial banking system, which operates 
with a high urban bias. Banks are located in the capital city, with just a few or no branches 
at all in the rural areas. The rural people and the excluded urban people (low income 
people) resort to informal financial source to satisfy the needs. Between the formal and 
informal financial sector, there is the semi formal sector. Microfinance institutions belong 
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to this sector. The development of this sector is due mainly to failure of governmental 
banks to finance the rural people and the difficulties to mobilize the savings from informal 
activities.  
The overall policy framework for microfinance is informed by the poverty reduction 
strategy, which seeks to balance growth and macroeconomic stability with human 
development and empowerment in such a way as to positively impact the reduction of the 
country’s poverty levels in the medium term. The benefit that microfinance provides to 
low-income households and microenterprises has positive implications for the overall 
economy. 
Microfinance sector 
The first institution was found by the government and was called “Caisse Rurale 
d’Epargne (CREP-COOPEC)” in 1976. It worked essentially in rural areas. In 1995, the  
extended to urban areas and its name changed to UNACOOPEC-CI. The microfinance 
sector exists since long years ago, but its regulation guiding its operating came into effect 
only in 1994. The PARMEC law was instituted in 1994 in view of providing a legal 
framework for mutual organizations, savings and credit cooperatives and their unions and 
federations. The PARMEC law does not apply to tontines or other informal savings 
groups, but these groups are free to apply for recognition under the law. This law was 
adopted on 3rd July 1996 UEMOA member countries.  
In Côte d’Ivoire, Five (5) structures evolve for the good development and promotion of 
this sector through a control and monitoring. These are the National Commission for 
Microfinance, the Direction of Microfinance, and the work group for Microfinance, 
AISFD-CI and BCEAO.  
Around 70 organizations in Côte d’Ivoire provide a support to micro business owners, 
household credit. The sector is dominated by one type of MFIs the credit and saving union 
which is characterized by the mutual funds and cooperatives. The statistics in 2005, 
demonstrates this 73 against one (1) structure with convention signed with the 
government. In total, there are 74 MFIs in 2005. The leading structures are 
UNACOOPEC-CI and RCMEC and represented 90% of MFIs activities in Cote d’Ivoire. 
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The COOPEC network has 106 offices in activities during the year 2005 on all national 
territory and mobilizes 52 billion FCFAi of saving and 17 billion FCFA of outstanding net 
loan. And RCMEC has 51 offices, 3.1 billion FCFA of saving and 1.3 billion FCFA of 
outstanding net loan. There are no NGOs and other types (village banks, and Grameen 
Bank replications) evolving in the sector.  
An examination of the office geographical repartition on territory shows a higher density 
in the «Lagunes » area.in effect, the “LAGUNES” region where the economic capital is, 
totalizes 69 offices, i.e. 35%. Some regions such as WORODOUGOU, N’ZI-COMOE, 
SUD-COMOE, DENGUELE and BAS-SASSANDRA have between one (1) and four (4) 
offices; the percentage is between 0.5% and 2%. Others have a percentage comprised 
between 3% and 10%. The remark is most of MFIs are implemented in the forest areas 
given the economic activities and the coffee cocoa culture in these areas. This unequal 
distribution is accentuated between rural and urban areas. The latter concentrates 60% of 
MFIs in Côte d’Ivoire 
Concerning the resources, Savings constitute the mainly resources of the MFIs. They 
provide a relatively stable means to finance the loan portfolio. Savings outreach in 2005 is 
58.900 billion FCFA. In addition to savings, loans provisions and grants, shareholder 
capital constitutes the main source of funding. Loan outreach is 24.247billions FCFA in 
2005. On the figure below, we see the pattern of savings reflects this great preference for 
savings observed in credits unions. 
Figure 1: Evolution of Savings and Loan from 1998 to 2005. 
 
Source : author 
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The Ignoring context 
Some neglected factors could influence considerably the microfinance credit market in 
Côte d’Ivoire. As Lashley and Lord (2002), we demonstrate that the lack of appreciation 
of specific contingent circumstances that surround the delivery of microfinance is one of 
the main hindrances to the success of microfinance. This lack of appreciation concerns: 
1-Microfinance institutions represents the hope to access to some form of financial 
services for microentrepreneurs, other disadvantaged groups and households, often lack 
professionalism and institution capabilities. There exists a lack of understanding of credit 
policies, the specific nature and characteristics of poverty. In Côte d’Ivoire, poverty is 
rural, young, and female. There is a severe lack of targeting specific areas more 
particularly the remote areas (CNM, 2005). 
2- The poor credit culture from formal and semi formal institutions of the population. The 
population has a great preference from credit provided by parents, friends, relatives, 
moneylenders,etc. In the literature, borrowing from informal source is the situation where 
the borrower is rationed from both formal and semi formal source of credit. However, 
when we take the Ivorian situation, borrowing from the informal source is the first choice. 
The survey used in this chapter corroborates this. 57out of 1,286households addressed 
their demand to microfinance institutions. The major part of population turned towards 
informal sector. They represent 87.1percent.  
3- What are the main financial needs of household? Is it credit for production purpose 
alone or does a multifaceted approach to be implemented (Lashley, 2004). The success in 
extending and recovering credits to small enterprises has been often based on the 
determination of actual patterns of demand and the identification the relative levels of risk 
involved. 
The importance of Social capital in the choice of credit source 
Social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively 
(Woolcock and al.,2000). Intuitively, the basic idea of “social capital” is that one’s family, 
friends, and, associates constitute an important asset, one that can be called upon in a 
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crisis, enjoyed for its own sake, and/or leveraged for material gain. Fox (1996) defines 
social capital as a social organization, relationship of cooperation and reciprocity, 
networks and leadership that facilitate collective action. 
More generally, social capital’s definition depends on which level is considered. For 
example, at the country level, social capital is viewed as the degree of trust in government 
or other societal institutions (Fukuyama, 1995 cited in Okten and Osili, (2004)), social 
cohesion, reciprocity and institutional effectiveness. This includes the willingness to 
participate in civil society and obey the law and a general efficacy in the workings of civil 
administration. These definitions are more abstract.  
At the community level, Jacobs (1961) posits that social capital exists as 'neighborhood 
networks,' or as Putnam (1993) (cited in Gomez and Santor (2001)) suggests, it signifies 
'features of social life such as networks, norms, and trusts that enable participants to act 
together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. That is, social capital could be 
thought of as the extent and quality of connections within communities. 
Finally, social capital can be attributed to the level of an individual. As Gleasar, Laibson, 
and Sacerdote (2002) note that, 'an individual's social capital characteristics include 
charisma, status and access to networks that enable that person to extract something 
beneficial to the individual. Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, (2002a) defines social capital 
broadly as the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes, and values that govern 
interactions among people and contribute to economic and social development. This 
definition depicts closely the developing countries’ situation.  
Social capital plays a great role in the Ivorian context. We use the definition given by 
Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, (2002a). Therefore, when we talk about social capital, we 
take as measures a set of social groups in which households evolve. Those groups give 
some cultural similarities to the potential borrowers. They include ethnic groups. Some 
Ethnic has a great preference for the loans given by the parents and relatives; hence that 
influences participation in credit programs. A majority of credit transactions among these 
groups take place in the informal sector.  
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Figure 2: borrowing behavior according to the ethnic groups 
 
Source: author 
At this, we add the degree of trust in MFIs as stipulated by Okten and Osili, (2004). 
From this development comes our hypothesis: the social capital plays a negative effect on 
the choice of formal MFIs. 
3. Review of literature 
Participation and access to microfinance’s credit program 
Before starting with the study, there is a need to make some limitations. In the literature, 
access to credit and participation to credit program are used interchangeably. Some 
authors think that a distinction must be made between the two (Zeller, 1994). Diagne and 
Zeller (2001) think that there is a difference between access to credit and participation to a 
credit program. A household has access to credit from a particular source if it can borrow 
from that source. A household participates if it borrows from that source of credit. Thus, a 
household can have access but choose not to borrow, i.e., do not participate to the credit 
market. Participation could be defined as the effective access to credit program.  
Most studies have been explained mainly the low rate of participation by the interest rate. 
Many policymakers assume that borrowers base their decisions on one particular loan 
component, that is, the interest rate. However, focusing on interest rates alone is not 
sufficient to explain borrowers’ choices for or against a particular financial intermediary 
(Nguyen, 2006). Ranking lenders according to interest rates and transaction costs only, 
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implies that borrowers most likely will make use of those lenders with lowest rates and 
costs. But borrowers’ decisions to accept or reject are influenced by other factors as well 
(Zander, no date, cited in Nguyen, 2006). Some borrowers might be afraid of prohibition 
or untrustworthiness of the lender because they formerly have had overdue debt. Some 
others fear refusal due to lack of collateral. Loan duration also influences borrowing 
decisions - whether it is compatible with the life cycle or not. Some borrowers who are 
illiterate or have low education find it difficult to cope with the complex procedure of 
credit applications typical of many formal lenders. . 
Diagne (1999) used the concept of credit limit to identify determinants of access to and 
participation of households in informal and formal credit market in Malawi. His results 
show that (1) there exists severe credit constraint in Malawi, (2) the composition of 
household assets is much more important as a determinant of household access to formal 
credit than the total value of household assets or landholding size. However, landholding 
size remains a significant determinant of access to informal credit. (3), the unobserved 
program-specific attributes captured by the program dummy variables are the most 
significant factors that influence household decisions to participate in a credit program. 
These unobserved program-specific attributes include the types of loans provided and 
restriction on their use. There are also other educational and social services provided by 
the programs.  
By using a micro-econometric analysis of household surveys, Duong and Izumida (2002) 
examined the rural household participation in the Vietnamese rural credit market. The 
empirical results showed that due to segmentation of rural credit market in Vietnam, 
households are rational in deciding the sources from which they should ask for particular 
kinds of loans. It was found that, total farming area and total value of livestock are 
decisively the determinants of borrowing by households from the formal financial 
institutions. 
Nguyen (2007) applies probit model to estimate credit program participation and Tobit 
model to estimate loan amount received. By separating the source of loan, he expects that 
the determinants of credit participation will be different as the eligible requirements for 
borrowing are different between sources. He specifies credit program participation or the 
loan size as a function of household characteristics including gender of household head, 
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age of household head, number of household members, education level of household 
head, agricultural work, value of house and land holding size; and of commune 
characteristics including distance from commune to the nearest Government banks and 
distance from commune to the nearest. His findings are: Number of members in a 
household is found to have a large and significant affect on credit participation, especially 
from formal source. Farm work is also significant. Household is more likely to borrow if 
head of household is working in agriculture or self-business 
Despite the success of Microfinance, with a few exceptions, the literature has ignored the 
social capital impact on Microfinance credit program participation. That lack of attention 
is changing slowly. In recent years, several papers were written and projects were 
launched to explore the relationship between Microfinance and social capital. 
Participation, social capital in microfinance 
The concept of Social capital has been used at several levels in microfinance literature. 
The area where he has been used most frequently is that of information asymmetric 
alleviation. The success of the programs of microfinance as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, 
BancoSol in Bolivia relies heavily on the notion that borrowers can utilize their social 
capital to overcome many of the problems associated with asymmetric information in 
credit markets (e.g., adverse selection, moral hazard, state verification, and contract 
enforcement) (Gomez and Santor, 2001). 
Group membership is an essential tool for screening loan applications and for ensuring 
that contracts can be enforced (Aryeetey, 2005). Generally, most studies investigate on the 
role of the social capital on the group lending to reduce the asymmetric information 
problems. It uses when they talk about the higher rate of repayment. Using data collected 
from FINCA, Peru, Karlan (2001) finds that social capital generates higher repayment and 
higher savings. But those analyze do not investigate on the choice of source of credit. 
After that, we have Social capital as Information diffusion network which could influence 
the credit program participation. Consider a given borrower who seeks credit for an 
investment project or to smooth consumption in the face of adverse shocks to income. For 
the potential borrower, the decision to apply to a specific credit source for a loan will 
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depend on the availability of reliable information about lending institutions. Thus family 
and community provide them this information. That contributes to decrease the search 
cost. Potential borrowers may learn about lending institutions and credit contracts through 
community activities and neighborhood meetings, or through informal interactions with 
neighbors and family members. Family and community networks can facilitate the flow of 
high-quality information about new credit market opportunities, thus lowering the search 
costs of the borrower (Okten and Osili, 2004).There is an important theoretical literature 
that demonstrates how networks can facilitate the circulation of information about market 
opportunities. Kranton (1996) provides a model in which a decentralized network of 
pairwise interactions helps agents reduce search costs.  
Finally, we have Social capital as source of loan. The network formed by the parents, 
relatives, neighbors, religious communities, etc, constitutes a cheaper source of credit. The 
presence of this source constitutes a stronger competitor for microfinance institutions. 
4. Research Methodology 
Source and Data characteristics 
The data used in this research is the households Living Standard Survey conducted in 
2002 by National Statistics Institute. The research unit is the household and the people 
who live in it. The 2002 households Living Standards Survey is a nationwide, multi-topic 
household survey with modules covering numerous aspects of living standards. It covered 
10,800 households living in Côte d’Ivoire. The surveys contain detailed information of 
households from all regions of country. The household survey has 12 sections. It gathered 
data on education, health and employment status of household members, household 
economic activities, income and expenditure, household size and housing, borrowing and 
lending activities. Concerning the credit aspect, we are retaining only the household who 
are made a loan demand. Therefore, the sample size in our study is 1,286 households. 
Household demographic profile of the 1286 respondents surveyed indicates that the 
average age of a household head is 43 years and about 84.06% of them fall in the 
economically active population (ages 18-59). Majority of household heads (53.03%) have 
no formal education. Approximately 19.75% and 22.55% have low and medium education 
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level respectively. Male-headed households constitute 82.89%. The average household 
size is 5.65 persons per household with an average proportion of 82.89% of female and 
17.11% for male (Table2). Christianity and adherents to non traditional religion constitute 
about 39% and 24% respectively and Islam 35%. Majority of sampled households are 
Akan constituting 30.17%. 30.48% of households live in other urban areas (table1). 
Table 1: Household socio-economic characteristics 
Variable Percentage (%) 
Age composition (%)  
Age (Less than 18 years) 0.23 
Age (from 18-59 years) 84.06 
Age (+ 60 years) 15.71 
Marital Status (%)  
Married  71.77 
Unmarried 15.24 
Other (divorced, separated, widow, widower 12.99 
Education (%)  
No education 53.03 
Low education 19.75 
Medium education 22.55 
High education 4.67 
Religion (%)  
Christian 39.11 
Moslem 35.93 
Other (traditional, no religion, other) 24.96 
Area (%)  
Abidjan 16.80 
Other urban areas 30.48 
Eastern rural forest 16.87 
Western rural fores 19.21 
Rural savannah 16.64 
Source: own computation from 2002 INS Survey Data 
Table 2: Household demographic characteristics 
Variable Mean St dev Min Max 
Total household size 5.3 4.01 1 30 
No. of Females 5.67 3.77 1 18 
No. of male 5.64 4.06 1 30 
Household head     
Male 82.89 .37 0 1 
Female 17.11 .37 0 1 
Source: own computation from 2002 INS Survey Data 
Low income household descriptive characteristics 
The SMIG in Côte d’Ivoire is taken to define the low income households. SMIG is about 
36000FCFA. In our sample, 60.34% of households fall under this line. We can call this 
proportion of households “the poor” or low income households. In addition, the 
  15
households can have the similar income but the other characteristics are different. Those 
specificities could impact on the household credit program participation. The 60.34% of 
households falling under the SMIG line are composed essentially of economically active 
households (78.61%). The ranges 25-39 and 40-59 have 35.05% and 35.57% respectively. 
Table 3: Percentage of households by income (poor and non-poor) and age groups of 
household heads. 
Age Group Income level
(in years) Low income Higher income
<=24 8.37 3.53
25-39 35.05 47.25
40-59 35.57 41.57
60+ 21.00 7.64
total 100 100
Source: own computation from 2002 INS Survey Data 
The tables below give the distribution of the income according to age, gender and 
education levels. The distribution of range of age according to income supports the life 
cycle hypothesis. The most of young household and the old household heads are low 
income. Their percentages are 78.31% and 80.69% respectively. 
Table 4: Percentage of households heads age by income (low income and higher 
income)  
Age Group Age_24 Age 2539 Age4059 Age 60+
(in years) 
Low income 78.3 53.02 56.56 80.69
Higher 
income 
21.7 46.98 43.44 19.31
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: own computation from 2002 INS Survey Data 
The studies on income state that the income level depends on the education. 69.06% of 
households with no education have a low income. The pattern is the same for the 
households where the head is low educated .68.9% of this type of households have a low 
income. The higher education attainment increases the income. So 75% of higher 
educated households are higher income households. 
Table 5: Percentage of households by income low income and higher income) and education level 
of household heads. 
 
Education levels Income level ( percent) Total
 Low income Higher income
nedu 69.06 30.94 100
ledu 68.9 31.1 100
medu 39.65 60.35 100
hedu 0.25 0.75 100
Source: own computation from INS 2002 survey data 
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The income can also be influenced by the gender. Some studies think the women are very 
poor than the man. Our statistics support that. 77.73% of women are poor since they are 
low income households. However, the part of male is not neglected. 
Table 6:Distribution of households by income and gender. 
gender Income level total 
 Low income Higher income  
female 77.73 22.27 100 
male 56.75 43.25 100 
Source : own computation from 2002 INS survey data 
Statement of dependant variable 
The dependant variable was households’ choice of financing for their activities. The 
dependent variable is the source of borrowing. The alternative sources available are: bank 
and financial institutions, companies of framing, credit unions, social funds, ROSCAs, 
private lenders, cooperatives, and others giving a total eight (8) alternatives. Then, the 
dependent variable takes several alternatives, and so conventional methods of regression 
are inappropriate. To ensure a better organization, these alternatives are grouped and 
reformulated as (0) banks institutions for Banks and financial institutions, companies of 
framing, social funds; (1) formal MFIs which are credit unions; and (2) informal 
institutions for ROSCAs, private lenders, cooperatives and others. The dependent variable 
is represented by souborr. When there is a demand for credit, a household will choose to 
apply to either a formal institution, public institutions, Credit unions (formal MFIs), or an 
informal credit institution, depending on their perceived relative probabilities of obtaining 
credit from each institution. The descriptive statistics of souborr are shown in table below.  
Table 7: Households’ choice of source of borrowing 
    souborr  |      Freq.        Percent(%)                       Cum. 
------------ +--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
banks       0|         88           6.84                          6.84 
formal MFIs 1|         57           4.43                         11.28 
Informal    2|      1,141          88.72                        100.00 
------------+---------------------------------------------------------- 
      Total  |      1,286         100.00 
Source: own computation from INS survey data (2002) 
For souborr, the most suitable regression is a multinomial regression. 
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Definitions of Explanatory Variables  
While socioeconomic characteristics such as income, wealth, and education play the 
largest roles in explaining access, there is clear evidence of the effect of other sets of 
barriers. Thus, the independent variables are: 
Gender of household head: Since there is a positive discrimination in favor of women, 
we think gender influence a priori the demand of credit to MFIs. This discrimination is 
due to the fact the higher rate of repayment is observed among women. And also, they are 
generally poorer than men. Here the variable is male. Being a male reduces the probability 
of participation or the demand for credit. 
Education: can influence participation in microfinance credit program. Formal and semi 
formal sources require more papers to fill. We assume that the probability for a person 
who is not educated to take loan from formal and semi formal is lower. They avoid them. 
We make the following hypothesis, households with a good educational level are more 
likely to choose more formal or semi formal financing practices than less educated ones. 
Age . There is negatively correlation between age and the probability of participate in 
credit program from formal and semi formal.  
Timrepaym represents the variable measuring the loan maturity: Longer is the loan 
maturity more the household demand the credit from MFI. The argument is that lenders 
lend small amount and have maturity periods that minimize costs, often in a way that 
make their loans less attractive to businesses. The loan characteristics of microfinance 
schemes indicate that their loans are comparable to those of most existing informal 
arrangements. Loan maturities are generally short. 
Marital status (Matstat): Marital status could influence the sectoral choice of lending. In 
other instances, certain spouses prefer work and the wife remains at home. 
Households’ size (hhsize): the role of households’ size can be seen indirectly. The larger 
the household the greater is its expenditure. The direction of relationship between this and 
participation in credit program may however be ambiguous. 
Use of loan: the households often examines whether there is need to fund their activity by 
loan when involving in income generating activities, or they need a loans for the 
education, mortgage, health and consumption purpose.  
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Perception (Perc): Households live in an environment where the information exchanged 
plays an important role. This information influences their perception about credit 
institutions. Perceptions wonder around: 1.higher own resource, 2.lack of information, 
3.lacks of credit structure, 4.higher loan cost. The probability to demand a credit and 
participation in credit program from microfinance institutions is negatively linked to the 
perceptions. 
Income: income is the key variable observed by the lenders. Depending on the flow of 
revenue, households can get credit or not. Although, the collateral (physical assets) is not 
required for some microfinance credit program, we consider income as wealth for the 
households. This households wealth includes the endowment such as land, housing. Two 
proxies are used to capture this aspect. Those are Household has a house (house) and 
Household has a land (land).  The probability to participate or demand to credit is 
positively linked to wealth. Since these can be served as a proxy for collateral. 
Social capital variables 
The social capital will be captured by the ethnicity group of the borrowers and the trust in 
MFIs. 
Ethnicity: Ethnic affiliation which create network is common in Côte d’Ivoire. We would 
assume the appurtenance to certain groups facilitates the possibility of having a loan. 
Thus, the hypothesis could be that ethnicity can influence positively or negatively 
participation in credit program. 
Lack of trust( ltrust): The lack of trust impacts negatively on the choice of MFIs as 
source of loan. 
Size of loan(loansize): we assume the size of loans has an impact on the choice of source 
decision.  
profession: This regroups the civil servant , the private informal workers, the students, the 
unemployed. 
Cost of lending 
Like any other service/product, the participation in the microfinance credit program is 
likely to be affected by their price. In such case, holding other factors constant, the 
higher the interest rate charged, the lower the demand or participation in credit would 
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be observed. However, we are unable to capture the impact of interest rates on the 
participation in credit as this variable is not consistently captured in the survey. 
Therefore, no cost variable was included in the empirical model because these 
variables don’t exist in the data. 
As stipulated above, the multinomial regression will be implemented to know the 
determinants of households’ participation to microfinance program. Multinomial logistic 
regression is the extension for the (binary) logistic regression when the categorical 
dependent outcome has more than two levels.  Multinomial Logit models are 
multiequations models. These models are applied in Educational choice, labor economics 
in particular the job search, and transportation. The well-known works on multinomial 
Logit are Hensher (1986),McFadden (1974) on the travel mode of urban commuters; 
Schmidt and Strauss (1975) and Boskin(1974) on occupational choice among multiple 
alternatives(cited in Greene, 2002) 
In our sample, the data for each household’s head consist of following: 
• Participation which takes three (3) alternatives: 0 = banks, 1= formal MFIs, 2= 
informal 
•  The regressors are constant term, education, age, gender, ethnicity, household size, 
income, household endowment wealth, use of loans, marital status, perception, 
profession 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
Estimates of the multinomial logit model are presented in Table A2. The base chosen is 
informal. The software used is STATA 10 The convectional Wald test statistic follows a 
2χ  distribution with 74 degrees of freedom and is significant at 1%. It rejects the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero. The problem of heteroscedasticity is often present 
in cross sectional data. In order to avoid this, we are adopting the multinomial robust 
estimation which that adjusts the z-statistics. 
The results for each alternative give: for banks institutions, the variables loansize, 
timrepaym and house have positive signs and are significant at 1%, 1% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. However, Privinformal, age4059, unemployed,schoolcredit and 
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health have negative and significant signs at 5%, 10%, 5%, 5%and 1% level of 
significance respectively. 
Concerning the formal MFIs, the variables income_36, income36-100, income101-250, 
loansize, house, married, unmarried, krou, and timrepaym have statistically significant 
positive effect on borrowing from this source while pensioner, ltrust, and health have 
negative effects at 1%, 10% and 5% level. 
The predicted probabilities for each source are given as follow: .04469614; 01897264; 
0.93633122 for banks institutions, formal MFIs and informal respectively. The predicted 
probability of informal is greater than those of Banks institutions and formal MFIs. That 
confirms the fact the informal source is not the last resort source. It demonstrates the 
higher role of social capital as a facilitator of borrowing in the Ivorian context. 
For the further details on how each explanatory variable explains households’ choice, we 
divide the variables into four categories: individual and household characteristics, social 
network variables, variable related to credit contract and use of loans variables. The 
marginal effects of the variables are computed.  
The effect of individual and household level characteristics 
• Income 
We are dividing income into several modules. This is to capture the effect of low income 
on the choice of source. The probability to borrow from formal MFIs source increases 
about 99% than the informal source for all categories. These marginal effects are 
significant and very higher. 
• Age 4059 
The probability of participating of bank credit program is lower when the household head 
is aged between 40 years and 59 years. This probability is reduced about 3.17%. 
• Marital status (base is other marital status) 
The probability to choose formal MFIs source is greater for married and unmarried 
household heads. The positive and marginal effects show that the marital status is not 
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the requirement to fill before obtained the loans. So, there is no discrimination 
between the several statuses. 
• privinformal 
When the household head works in the private informal, the probability to choose the 
bank is lower than the probability of choosing informal. The salaries received justify this 
probability. In effect, in Côte d’Ivoire as the other developing countries, the salary in the 
informal is very low. Sometimes, this wage is under the SMIG  
• unemployed 
When the household head is unemployed, the probability to choose bank is lower than the 
probability of choosing informal. the reason is there is no future revenue from those 
persons. So they represent the higher risk people and that lead the bank to ration them. 
Knowledge of that will made the unemployed prefer the informal source. 
• pensioner 
When the household head is pensioner, the probability to choose the microfinance credit 
program is lower than the probability of choosing informal. The tendency observed in 
Côte d’Ivoire is they prefer savings products but borrowing from the informal source. 
The effects of the variables related to credit contract 
• Timrepaym 
An increase of the time of repayment impacts positively on the choice of credit program 
from Banks and formal MFIs These marginal effects are significant at 5% level 
respectively. The positive effect observed means the households take into the time of 
reimburse the loans before borrowing from one source of credit. if the time of repayment 
increases and then the probabilities of participating in the formal and semi formal 
increase. 
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• house 
A positive and significant effect on formal MFIs is noticed for house. That means the 
physical wealth as house continues to be used as collateral by some microfinance 
structures. 
• size of loan 
One amount increase of the loan size increases the probability of choosing the Banks 
credit program about 9.65e-09. The formal banks means large equity, therefore it would 
be preferable to borrow from this source if the amount demanded is large. 
The social capital effect 
• Lack of trust 
The expected effects on the choice of formal MFIs credit participation have been 
confirmed for the explanatory variables such as ltrust. The lack of trust reduces the 
probability of choosing formal MFIs about 1.67%.  
The effects of the variables related to use of loans 
• Schoolcredit 
When the use of loans is the education expenses, the probability of choosing the banks 
credit program is low than the informal source. Consequently, the informal source is more 
adequate for satisfying this need. Sometimes, the borrower must hide the true motivation 
for having the loan. 
• health 
Loan for health expenses conduct to the low probabilities for choosing the Banks and 
formal MFIs source than the others motivations. Most of the time, there is no products 
designated for the health purpose in the microfinance institutions. Consequently, the 
informal source is more adequate for satisfying this need. 
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6. conclusion 
Understanding the socioeconomic factors influencing the determinants of 
households’participation in microfinance credit program is useful for future policy 
designs. This study attempts to identify the determinants of the choice of source of credit, 
in particular the determinants of participation in microfinance credit program. Several 
lessons are drawn. First, microfinance remains the ideal way to provide financial service 
to the excluded people from formal bank sector. This aspect is verified by the positive 
marginal effect observed in the case of the low income household choice.  
Second, some variables such as lack of trust in microfinance structures, and the sensitivity 
of households to interest rate contribute to the reduction of probability of household 
participation in microfinance credit program. Therefore, another lesson drawn from this 
study is Ivorian microfinance institutions should try to create social capital networks 
among themselves and between them and borrowers. According to Dowla (2006), the 
success of Grameen bank rests mainly on the creation of social capital (horizontal and 
vertical networks). It established new norms and fostering a new level of social trust to 
solve the collective action problems of poor people’s access to capital. That would be 
important for sustainability of these institutions. 
And then, agricultural activities and trade activities do not statistically determine 
participation in microfinance credit program. But the loan for health purpose impacts on 
negatively the choice of the microfinance credit program. There is a need to diversify the 
loans products proposed to the Ivorian household. This is important for avoiding the use 
of loans for others purposes. 
Finally, the time of repayment contribute to increase this probability. Finally, they must 
apply the flexible time of repayment. In addition, the positive and significant sign 
observed for the loan size would suggest the size of loans oriented the borrower’s 
decisions. 
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APPENDICES  
Table A1: Description of variables, measurement units and expected effects for the choice  
 
Variables Description Measurement unit Expectation sign 
Income Total income of household head 
(FCFA/month) 
Number 
(FCFA/month) 
- 
Household size Number of household members Number - 
Age Age of household head   
Education  Dummy NA 
No education head of household has no education  + 
Low education head of household has some primary 
schooling. 
 + 
Medium education head of household finished primary 
schooling or continued to secondary school 
 + 
High education head of household completed secondary or 
higher. 
 - 
wealth Household has an endowment    
Physical weath(house)  Dummy + 
land  Dummy + 
Time of repayment Is term of loan maturity number - 
Perceptions The household has priori on the lenders dummy NA 
ors Household has its own resources   - 
lackinfo Households has no information on the credit 
program 
 - 
lcs Lack of credit structure in household’area  - 
hloancost Higher loan cost  - 
lstrust Lack of trust in the structures  - 
other Other reasons given by the household  - 
Use of loan  dummy NA 
agriactiv Activity generated is in agricultural sector   
Tradeactiv The trade activities   
Schoolcredit    
mortgage    
health    
Marital status Household is married, single and other  dummy NA 
married    
unmarried    
omastat    
etnicity Native language spoken by the household.  dummy NA 
akan    
krou    
manden    
mandes    
volta    
other    
Profession    
Civil servant    
Privinformal 
Student 
Pensioner 
unemployed 
 
  
Loan size    
Note: + denote a positive effect on the dependent variable, - denote a negative effect on the dependent variable, NA denotes 
“not applicable” 
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Table A2: statistics description of explanatory variables  
 
    Variable        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
      hhsize       1286    5.650855    4.011097          1         30 
   timrepaym       1286     2.77916    4.235231          0         75 
       house       1286    .5155521    .4999525          0          1 
        land       1286    .5793157     .493861          0          1 
   unmarried       1286    .1524106    .3595582          0          1 
     married       1286    .7177294    .4502794          0          1 
  schoolcredit     1286    .1726283    .3780726          0          1 
    Mortgage       1286    .0202177     .1407991         0          1 
      health       1286     .222395     .4160169         0          1 
        akan       1286    .3017107     .459179          0          1 
        krou       1286    .1469673    .3542111          0          1 
      manden       1286    .1251944     .331068          0          1 
      mandes       1286    .0940902    .2920677          0          1 
       volta       1286    .1360809    .3430078          0          1 
      moslem       1286    .3592535    .4799683          0          1 
   christian       1286    .3911353    .4881944          0          1 
        nedu       1286    .1975117    .3982765          0          1 
        medu       1286    .2255054    .4180773          0          1 
        hedu       1286    .0466563    .2109837          0          1 
   agriactiv       1286    .6275272    .4836514          0          1 
  tradeactiv       1286      .31493    .4646687          0          1 
         ors       1286    .6531882    .4761404          0          1 
    lackinfo       1286    .0108865    .1038091          0          1 
         lcs       1286    .0396579      .19523          0          1 
   hloancost       1286    .1150855    .3192493          0          1 
      ltrust       1286    .1041991    .3056375          0          1 
      age_24       1286    .0645412    .2458101          0          1 
     age2539       1286    .3989114     .489865          0          1 
     age4059       1286    .3794712    .4854442          0          1 
   income_36       1286    .6034215    .4893774          0          1 
   inc_36100       1286    .2293935    .4206063          0          1 
  inc_101250       1286    .1244168    .3301848          0          1 
  amloan           1286     1168523     7000765       1000   1.34e+08 
civilservant       1286    .0451011    .2076066          0          1 
privinformal       1286    .5847589    .4929553          0          1 
        male       1286    .8289269    .3767193          0          1 
student            1286    .2783826    .4483771          0          1 
  pensioner        1286    .0085537    .0921254          0          1 
     unemployed    1286    .0186625    .1353827          0          1 
   male            1286    .8289269    .3767193          0          1 
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Table A3: Results of the estimated Multinomial Logit model 
Multinomial logistic regression                    Number of obs = 1286 
                                                 Wald chi2(74) = 216.36 
                                                    Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -441.95681                    Pseudo R2 = 0.1966 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |               Robust 
     souborr |   Coef.   Std. Err.    z     P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
Banks instit. 
      inc_36 | -1.247711  1.92937    -0.65   0.518  -5.029207  2.533786 
    inc36100 | -.5908645  1.863149   -0.32   0.751  -4.242569   3.06084 
   inc101250 | .1402418   1.827617    0.08   0.939  -3.441821  3.722304 
      hhsize | .0232424  .0302013     0.77   0.442  -.0359512  .0824359 
    loansize | 2.28e-07*** 6.05e-08    3.76   0.000   1.09e-07  3.46e-07 
       house | .4766526*  .2890698    1.65   0.099  -.0899138   .043219 
        land | -.0187328  .3460572   -0.05   0.957  -.6969925   6595269 
     married | -.0458296  .4944698   -0.09   0.926  -1.014973  .9233133 
   unmarried | .4022664   .5728804    0.70   0.483  -.7205586  1.525091 
        akan | -.4650794  .3908169   -1.19   0.234  -1.231066  .3009077 
        krou | -.3058759  .4958683   -0.62   0.537  -1.27776   .6660081 
      manden | .3314381   .4449288    0.74   0.456  -.5406064  1.203483 
      mandes | -.5962786  .6429578   -0.93   0.354  -1.856453  .6638956 
       volta | -.2340464  .4441307   -0.53   0.598  -1.104527   6364337 
civilservant | .6276141   .5523619    1.14   0.256  -.4549953  1.710224 
   pensioner | .4553679   .9984599    0.46   0.648  -1.501578  2.412313 
privinformal | -.5708525**  .2835205  -2.01   0.044  -1.126542 -.0151626 
        nedu | .2037457   .37639      0.54   0.588  -.5339651   .941456 
        hedu | -1.131845  .7628209   -1.48   0.138  -2.626946   .363257 
        medu | -.3574642  .4740407   -0.75   0.451  -1.286567  .5716385 
   agriactiv | .2633974   .5922907    0.44   0.657  -.8974711  1.424266 
  tradeactiv | -.2466918  .6207938   -0.40   0.691  -1.463425  .9700418 
         ors | -.3178967  .4564574   -0.70   0.486  -1.212537  .5767433 
    lackinfo | .2216317   1.320308    0.17   0.867  -2.366125  2.809388 
         lcs | -.8989004  1.069071   -0.84   0.400  -2.99424    1.19644 
   hloancost | -.5028274 .6012011    -0.84   0.403  -1.68116   .6755051 
      ltrust | -.3067145 .5747601    -0.53   0.594  -1.433224  .8197946 
        male | -.4719145  .4235261   -1.11   0.265  -1.30201   .3581815 
     age2539 | -.2481006 .4223625    -0.59   0.557  -1.075916  .5797147 
     age4059 | -.7877411* .4158803    -1.89  0.058  -1.602851   .0273693 
schoolcredit | -1.001901** .4641006   -2.16  0.031  -1.911522  -.0922809 
    mortgage | -1.250646  2.025286   -0.62   0.537  -5.220133   2.71884 
      health | -1.015305*** .3684645  -2.76   0.006  -1.73748  -.2931273 
    student  | .4603977  .2895704    1.59   0.112  -.1071499   1.027945 
  unemployed | -7.195077**  3.232262  -2.23  0.026  -13.53019  -.8599595 
   timrepaym | .0376228**  .0182619    2.06   0.039   .0018301  .0734155 
      age_24 | .2359     .6208193     0.38   0.704  -.9808834  1.452683 
       _cons | -1.142175  2.109806   -0.54   0.588  -5.277319   2.99297 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
formal MFIs 
      inc_36 | 16.82191*** 1.02621     16.39   0.000  14.81058  18.83325 
    inc36100 | 17.08472***   1.142201  14.96   0.000  14.84605   19.3234 
   inc101250 | 17.23098***   1.207749  14.27   0.000  14.86384  19.59813 
      hhsize | -.0220925 .0350521    -0.63    0.529  -.0907934 .0466083 
    loansize | 8.14e-08*   4.20e-08   1.94    0.053  -1.02e-09 1.64e-07 
       house | .5904946*  .3205175    1.84    0.065   -.0377082 1.218697 
        land | .5458911  .3829276    1.43    0.154   -.2046333 1.296415 
     married | 1.032585*  .6091789   1.70    0.090    -.1613835 2.226554 
   unmarried | 2.030386***  .6445374  3.15    0.002    .7671155 3.293656 
        akan | -.0007754  .4252902  -0.00    0.999   -.8343289 .8327781 
        krou | .8520135*  .4637037   1.84    0.066   -.0568292  .760856 
      manden | -.5364886  .5742017  -0.93    0.350   -1.661903 .5889261 
      mandes | -1.799848  1.154076  -1.56    0.119   -4.061796  4620999 
       volta | -.1695596  .5165845   -0.33   0.743   -1.182046   429274 
civilservant | .8889595   .5561997    1.60   0.110   -.2011719  .979091 
   pensioner | -30.18266***  .6991377  -43.17 0.000  -31.55294 -28.81237 
privinformal | .1228427  .4086582    0.30    0.764  -.6781126   .923798 
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        nedu | .6007615  .4040422    1.49    0.137  -.1911467   1.39267 
        hedu | -.3488865  .8929665   -0.39   0.696  -2.099069  1.401296 
        medu | -.6121669  .5355201   -1.14   0.253  -1.661767  .4374331 
   agriactiv | .2452016  .7529157    0.33    0.745  -1.230486  1.720889 
  tradeactiv | .477366   .7602743    0.63    0.530  -1.012744   .967476 
         ors | -.2934899 .4338854   -0.68    0.499  -1.14389   .5569099 
    lackinfo | .8501488  1.215562    0.70    0.484  1.532309   3.232606 
         lcs | -1.060206 1.049389   -1.01    0.312  -3.116969  .9965583 
   hloancost | -.9025432 .6588474   -1.37    0.171  -2.19386    .388774 
      ltrust | -1.462474*  .843776  -1.73    0.083  -3.116245 .1912967 
        male | -.4501447  .3786831   -1.19   0.235  -1.19235   .2920605 
     age2539 | .3664035   .5220895   0.70    0.483  -.6568731   1.38968 
     age4059 | .4540868  .5660472    0.80    0.422  -.6553454  1.563519 
schoolcredit | -.5403477  .4874342   -1.11   0.268  -1.495701  .4150057 
    mortgage | -.3872611   1.112206  -0.35   0.728  -2.567144  1.792622 
      health | -.817936&&   .4043689  -2.02   0.043  -1.610484 -.0253875 
     student | .2778149   .3118313    0.89   0.373   -.3333633  .888993 
  unemployed | -.7569673   1.517484  -0.50   0.618   -3.731182 2.217248 
   timrepaym | .0507695**  .020871    2.43   0.015   .009863    .0916759 
      age_24 | -1.330649   1.245192  -1.07  0.285    -3.77118   1.10988 
       _cons | -21.88683          .        .       .             .      
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(souborr==2 is the base outcome) 
Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
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Table A4: the marginal effects 
 Banks Institutions 
P(y=0)= .04469614 
Formal MFIs  
P(y=1)=.01897264 
 
Dy/dx p-value Dy/dx p-value 
Income-36 -.0643121* 0.059 .999521*** 0.000 
Income 36_100 -.0608704 0.296 .981715*** 0.000 
1ncome101_250 -.0445337*** 0.001 .9987653*** 0.000 
Hhsize .0010111 0.432 -.0004309 0.514 
Age_24 .0118949 0.711 -.0151751* 0.051 
Age2539 -.0106818 0.538 .0073242 0.484 
Age4059 -.0317981** 0.049 .0096589 0.411 
Timrepaym .0015634** 0.053 .0009131** 0.013 
house .019836 0.112 .0106098* 0.073 
land -.0012506 0.933 .009869 0.153 
Unmarried .0145061 .621 .0819229* 0.083 
Married -.0027185 0.900 .0161263* 0.063 
civilservant .0330945 0.384 .0234849 0.269 
pensioner .0254626 0.693 -.024429*** 0.000 
privinformal -.0258379* 0.065 .0027628 0.708 
Student .0213906 0.146 .0050084 0.440 
unemployed -.050739*** 0.000 -.0095668 0.522 
Akan -.0183774 0.206 .0003505 0.965 
Krou -.0126694 0.460 .0221124 0.158 
Manden 0163592 0.730 0.496 0.255 
Mandes -.0200336 0.264 -.018492*** 0.002 
Volta -.0091443 0.602 -0.576 0.743 
nedu .0081516 0.606 .0109597 0.128 
Medu -.0136253 0.424 -.0096139 0.223 
Hedu -.0312492** 0.022 -.0051355 0.685 
Agriactiv .0107383 0.655 .0042313 0.752 
Tradeactiv -.0105291 0.665 .0099931 0.566 
Ors -.0139419 0.516 -.0054086 0.547 
Lackinfo .0091181 0.891 .0236565 0.624 
Lcs -.0266094 0.221 -.0126148 0.133 
Hloancost -.0177126 0.334 -.0121815* 0.080 
Ltrust -.0111231 0.579 -.0167473*** 0.008 
male -.0227383 0.333 -.0090992 0.347 
loansize 9.65e-09*** 0.002 1.32e-09 0.185 
schoolcredit -.0324382*** 0.005 -.0080809 0.228 
mortgage -.0321441 0.249 -.0056084 0.706 
health -.0341901*** 0.001 -.0120288** 0.022 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
